Balochistan, the British and the Great Game by T.A. Heathcote

 

Balochistan, the British and the Great Game by T.A. Heathcote

Divide by Rule

What does one do when confronted by a country whose population is fractured by warring tribes, whose chief occupation is plunder, whose chief source of revenue is collection of protection money, and the foundation of criminal justice system is payment of blood money? What does one do, when the sovereign has no means of tax collection (primarily because there is no productive activity) but is nevertheless obliged to pay the tribal chiefs money to save his throne, and raise an army to put down periodic rebellion?

A civilized approach would be disarm the roving gangs, and nudge their members towards productive work on their lands, strengthen the central authority, provide loans for infrastructure, construct self-sustaining permanent assets, and help in establishing a credible criminal justice system aimed at reform rather than retribution. Tough? But doable as shown by the incomparable John Jacob, the Political Superintendent in Sind, in his dealings with the adjacent Khanate of Kalat. In recognition of his services, Khangarh was renamed as Jacobabad.

The officials of Punjab, the other state bordering Kalat, resorted to an alternative approach diametrically opposed to that of Jacob by encouraging the tribal chiefs in their internecine conflicts, by weakening the Khan and supporting the non-existent ‘confederacy of Chiefs’. Annual bribes were paid to a multiplicity of Chiefs, supposedly to secure protection for the trade caravans up the Bolan Pass, but actually to demonstrate that such protection was impossible to secure without stationing British (-Indian) troops on a permanent basis at Quetta. The policy of Punjab frequently frustrated that of Sind, but following Jacob’s death, Punjab’s handling of the frontier districts gained upper hand supported by a series of increasingly cynical Viceroys. That such an approach had led to the decimation of the Army of Indus in the first Afghan War (1839-42) was quite forgotten. History as they repeats, but in this instance, not as a farce, but as yet another tragedy causing the death of the British Political Agent (as ambassadors were then called) in Kabul and the destruction of an entire British regiment in Maiwand in the second Afghan War (1878-80). The garrison at Quetta could neither prevent this tragedy nor for that matter protect the supply lines during this crucial period as the British losses in the war, encouraged the plundering gangs to ever more adventure. In the final denouement, though only in 1893, after a further decade of intrigues, the Khan was replaced by his son.

In the backdrop of the more gory history of Afghanistan, Balochistan (and Sind) does not attract much attention in narrations of popular history. Heathcote has filled in the details of this great gap and deserves our gratitude. The text could have been made reader friendly, if it had been supplied with detailed maps. In the present edition, there are only two, wholly inadequate to provide the backdrop of the momentous movements of men, animals and armies which crisscross this wide area.

What do we learn from the History of this area? How shall we map our future? To answer these questions let us recap the events of over two hundred years of foreign intervention in Afghanistan. The first Afghan war saw the replacement of (old) Dost Muhammad with (the new?) Dost Muhammad. The second Afghan war saw the replacement of Sher Ali by his son. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a century later saw the newly implanted ruler Najibullah share the fate of Shah Shuja more than a hundred years ago. More recently American intervention saw the (old) Taliban replaced by the (new?) Taliban. Did any of these later day interventionists read their History lessons?

Given the current state of Afghanistan where even in the best of times tribal Jirgas trump the elected Parliament, and the range of tribal gangs recognize no international boundaries, it is best for the world to (i) realize that not only Afghanistan but Pakistan also, as a political entity is unsustainable, and (ii) await the birth of a visionary like John Jacob to bring peace to the area.