The Importance of
being Yahya
It is not often
remembered that the United States was knee deep in the morass that was the
Vietnam War, at the same time as the genocide in East Pakistan. The trial of
members of the US armed forces accused of the My Lai massacre ended on 29th
March 1971 bringing to public knowledge the horrors of the Vietnam War. Coming
as it did after the stalemate of the Korean War with an estimated 2-3 million
civilian deaths, the American public opinion was entirely opposed to America’s
entry into another Asian war. Responding to public opinion, Nixon was anxious
to end the Vietnam War. Instead of doing this honorably, admitting defeat and
negotiating a cease fire, he entered into subterfuge.
North Vietnam was
backed by Soviet Union and China, while South Vietnam was supported by the US.
Initially, the American support was financial and military, but starting around
1965, America put its own boots on the ground, leading to an unprecedented
escalation of the conflict. Nixon wanted to reach out to China, and persuade it
to moderate its support to North Vietnam. At the same time, it was thought that
a direct contact of the US with China would weaken the Soviet Union in the Cold
War. China and the Soviet Union had already begun to have differences over the
Soviet support to India in the 1962 and 1965 wars. China was also anxious to
gain global acceptance and acquire a permanent membership of the Security
Council. It decided to play ball with Nixon. Yahya, China’s poster boy in the
subcontinent agreed to play the courier in person.
Yahya was not the
only conduit to China, then available to the US. But the US chose Yahya over
the others, cleverly sensing that given the deep trouble he found himself in,
in his domestic politics, he would be most committed to render this service in
exchange for American support (page 104). True to his promise, Yahya succeeds
in arranging a meeting between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. Kissinger on a visit
to Pakistan, feigns illness, withdraws from public engagements, and secretly
flies off to China for this meeting (pages 115-116). Once the meeting was over,
and a direct China-US communication channel was established, Yahya’s utility in
furthering US foreign policy had effectively ceased. But the US continued to
prop up Yahya, to prove to their new ally China that the US was a firm and
reliable partner for the long term (pages 174, 237). Given that all these
developments took place it May-July 1971, the Hindus in East Pakistan paid a
heavy price over the next six months, with Yahya continuing his selective
genocide confident in the US’ support to his regime.
Interestingly,
China viewed the East Pakistan problem as similar to the problems posed by
Taiwan and Tibet to itself. China’s support to Pakistan was a direct
consequence of this perception. China was also on the verge of its own cultural
revolution (October 1971), the core of which was martial law and a strident
denunciation of capitalism. To shake hands with the US in this atmosphere had
its own challenges for China.
In the ultimate
analysis, each country pursued cynically its self-interest, as “India chose the
way of compassion” (page 190), hosted 10 million refugees on its soil, waged a
war at its own expense, and on its own strength, and liberated East Pakistan
without claiming any territory for itself, not even a buffer zone for the Hindu
and Buddhist minority as was suggested in some quarters.
Closing
Comments- A continuing selective genocide.
Those who do not
learn from history are condemned to repeat it. Today, fifty years after its
founding, the people of Bangladesh have chosen to forget their founding father,
Mujibur Rehman, having set fire to the museum and national monument to his
memory. They have desecrated the statue of Rabindranath Tagore, the author of
their national anthem. They have chosen to join hands with the state of Pakistan,
and the army of Pakistan, their former tormentors. They have attempted to
Arabize their language. They have once again embarked on the selective targeting
of their Hindu population, a move if unchecked can once again lead to selective
genocide. Is a war of liberation now possible? Can you liberate an already
liberated country? Can you wait for a crisis to unfold and then react to it?
We can no longer
close our eyes to the fact that the entire majority community in Bangladesh is
radicalized. Denying this and attributing the current developments to a radical
fringe is to delude ourselves until the next crisis should overtake us.
A calm and clearly
thought out policy that prescribes pro-active sustained ameliorative action during
the most normal of times can even now stave of crisis. The Citizens Amendment
Act (CAA) is now in place. A special window ought to be opened to admit into
Indian citizenship the religious minorities of Bangladesh, before they get
hounded out in the next crisis. Beginning slowly and imperceptibly, this ‘bringing
out’ must gather momentum with passing time. An infiltration of Bangladeshi
Muslims is already occurring at an alarming speed, with an estimated 10 million
illegal migrants already within India and dispersed wherever politicians seek
to establish a vote bank. While it is a herculean task to send such numbers
back, it should be comparatively easier to bring the persecuted minorities of
Bangladesh in. This latter population would integrate fully and help the
growing Indian economy which is staring at a declining democratic dividend in
the not so distant future (see Mukherjea and Rajahnsa, Behold the Leviathan).
The question is,
can India stand up this challenge?
